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Abstract 
Given that there is a growing emphasis in the field of alternative investment, this 
paper studies the effect of alternative investment in hedge funds and tests whether hedge 
funds that take positions in non-standard asset classes outperform hedge funds that take 
positions only in equity and fixed income securities. The Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor model is used to analyse the hedge fund returns. The seven-factor model is first 
tested with a substitute factor as the original factor data ceased to exist by 2007, then is 
extended to cover 2000-2006, 2007-2010, 2011-2015 period to examine its explanatory 
power, and finally used to obtain the alpha return of the hedge funds. The alpha return 
will be separated into two groups, with verse without alterative investment exposure. The 
alphas are tested to see if there is any difference between the two groups. An empirical 
comparison base on pure return will also be presented. We observe that the funds which 
have weights in non-standard assets earned a statistically significant excess alpha than the 
funds without exposure during the 2007 to 2010 period. It is possible that funds with 
investment in the non-standard assets could outperform those without exposure in future 
financial crisis. 
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Introduction 
For institutional investors, there is a growing investment trend of increasing 
portfolio weight in the non-standard asset classes such as commodity, currency and 
property. As early as 1990s, Lamm (1999) had found that non-standard assets, also 
known as “alternative investment assets”, have tremendously attracted investors’ interests 
because of investors’ expectation of those assets’ excellent risk-adjusted returns as well 
as diversification benefits. Swensen (2009) points out that institutional investors 
“investing only a small amount in traditional choices like U.S. equities and bonds, and 
devoting a more significant portion of the portfolio to a class of non-traditional assets 
known as alternative assets” included oil, gas and commodities. With a long period of 
history, hedge fund is one of the most important alternative investment asset classes. The 
flexible investment strategies and advanced management of hedge fund has continuously 
attracted investors’ preferences. As asset under management is boosting among those 
years,  like most institutional investors, hedge fund has also increased exposure in other 
non-standard asset classes. According to the Lipper TASS database, 48% hedge funds 
have portfolio weight in the typical non-standard asset classes at January of 2015.  
So whether hedge funds with exposure with non-standard asset classes would beat 
those funds without weight in non-standard asset classes is an interesting topic to discuss, 
as it could help those high-net wealth investors or institutional investors to make better 
decision when choosing hedge funds. This article apply William Fung and David A. 
Hsieh’s seven-factor model (2004) to analyse individual hedge funds returns and test if 
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hedge funds with exposure with non-standard asset classes will outperform those without 
non-standard asset classes. The hedge fund data source is from the Lipper TASS database 
and Wharton Hedge Fund Research Database. Seven-factor data are found through 
ThomsonOne.com Investment Banking’ database, official U.S. Federal Reserve website 
and David A. Hsieh's Data Library.  
We will divide our test into three steps: first we will replicate and extend the 
William Fung and David A. Hsieh’s seven-factor model to the year 2015 and test if it 
could still give good explanation of the hedge fund returns in recent years. Next we will 
modify the seven-factor model and add dummy variable of non-standard assets to test if 
non-standard asset classes allows funds generates a statistically significant alpha over the 
funds that only invest in traditional assets. We decided to split the time series data into 3 
periods of pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis because of financial crisis’ unique 
characteristics and their influence with asset returns. We also do the empirical test by 
compare cumulative return of the two group of hedge funds, one group is funds with non-
standard assets class exposure and another is funds only invest in the traditional assets. 
The empirical test analysis is showed in the Appendix. 
We construct the reminder of our paper as follows: Section 2 gives the literature 
review and Section 3 makes an introduction of the Non-standard Assets, followed by the 
Section 4 of the review of Hedge Fund. Section 5 and Section 6 separately describe the 
data and research methodology. Then analysis of test results in Section 7. In Section 8 we 
make our conclusion. 
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Literature review   
Leitner, Mansour and Naylor (2007) pointed that “Interest in alternative assets has 
gained increasing momentum” before financial crisis. Rosen (2015) demonstrates that 
despite the risk exposure of non-standard assets, the upside potential of them attracted 
increasing number of institutional investors. This is proved by the fact that in 2009, 
among all the university endowments, 90 percent held unconventional assets.  
There are several precedent literatures that have done series of empirical tests 
with the non-stand assets and their influence with the portfolio returns. For non-standard 
asset of Property, research findings designate that it is possible to included REITS with 
stocks in the portfolios holdings to reduce risk exposure (Kuhle, 1987; Chen et al., 
2005;). In addition, Bhuyan, Kuhle, Al-Deehani and Mahmood indicate that the equity 
EREITs provides diversification benefits and helps investors earn return from real estate 
investments without directly investing in properties. For non-standard assets as 
commodity, Bessler and Wolff (2015) prove that through most asset allocation strategies, 
if adding physical commodity and energy to a traditional stock and bond held portfolio, 
the performance will be greatly improved.  
There are also numerous empirical research focus on the exploring risk factor that 
could explain hedge fund returns. The most famous model is the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model and further four-factor model (2013) and five-factor model (2015) to 
describe general investment returns. Harvey-Siddique (2000) developed a two-factor 
model, an asset pricing model that incorporates conditional skewness. Their model 
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validate the intuition that if systematic skewness existed in asset returns, to accepting the 
risk, rewards should be included in the expected returns. Ding and Shawky (2007) 
improve performance estimates with traditional performance measures by using three-
factor models along with the two factor model which incorporates skewness. They 
conclude that “all hedge fund categories achieve above average performance when 
measured against an aggregate market index.”  Fung and Hsieh (2004) proposes a model 
of hedge fund returns that is similar to models based on arbitrage pricing theory, with 
dynamic risk-factor coefficients. For diversified hedge fund portfolios (as proxied by 
indexes of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds), the seven ABS factors can explain up 
to 80 percent of monthly return variations. 
Some trading strategies could also give good explanations of hedge fund 
performance. In 1997, Fung and Hsieh observe that hedge funds differentiate themselves 
from mutual funds because of their dynamic trading strategies, Fung and Hsieh further 
clarified five main investment styles in hedge funds. This clarification provided a basic 
framework for any further analysis on hedge fund investment styles.  
The 2007-2009 Financial crisis deeply impact the world economy and all the 
securities market were influenced. The underlying market condition changed significantly 
during the financial crisis and correlation between majority of the assets classes 
increased, thus the portfolio performance were greatly influenced. Billio, Getmansky, and 
Pelizzon (2009) clarify that average volatility and correlation between different hedge 
fund strategy returns surged with the impact of the financial crisis. Due to high volatility 
of the market, some hedge fund managers decreased their market exposure (Ben-David, 
Franzoni & Moussawi, 2011). On the other hand, some researchers such as Black, Brassil 
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and Hack (2010) focus on analysing the impact of the financial crisis on the traditional 
asset class markets of stock and bond. Both research support that financial crisis greatly 
changes the risk and return factors among each market around the world. Thus there is 
the necessity for us to divide our research into three period of pre-crisis period, during-
crisis period and post-crisis period and test how financial crisis influence the hedge fund 
returns. 
The papers discussed above inspire us to verify and extend the time period of  the 
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factor model to analyse the hedge fund returns and add 
innovation of whether hedge fund with weight in the non-standard assets outperform 
those funds without non-standard assets exposure. 
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Defining Non-standard assets  
Characteristics 
Generally alternative investments differ from conventional investments (stock, 
bond and cash). There are several categories of alternative investments: Hedge funds, 
Private Equity, Real Estate, Commodities, and Currencies. They all show different 
characteristics with the traditional assets and some alternative investment assets are also 
known as non-standard assets. Non-standard assets have the characteristics of low 
correlations with the traditional assets, which resulted in reduced portfolio risk after 
including alternative investments in the portfolio. Non-standard assets also have higher 
than average return than the traditional investments. Thus, adding non-standard assets to 
a portfolio with only conventional assets may increase expected returns. The reason for 
the higher returns is to compensate for the fact that non-standard assets are less efficiently 
priced and illiquid. The higher return could also cause by the fact that some non-standard 
assets often use leverage and thus increase both the return and risk
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Hedge Fund 
Background 
Hedge fund is a well-known vehicle of alternative investment and it is generally 
privately held and managed by some of the most outstanding investment managers. 
Those managers use more flexible investment strategies than the traditional investment 
managers. As there are less regulations for hedge funds, the funds attempted to generate 
“alpha” during both recession and market boom. Compared with the conventional 
investment institutions, e.g. mutual funds, the less regulation has provided hedge funds 
managers with fewer limitations in regard to using leverage, holding long and short 
positions, utilizing derivatives and putting weight on illiquid assets. The illiquid assets 
covers property, commodity and currencies and are generally categorized as the non-
standard assets.  
The investors of hedge funds traditionally are those people with high net wealth, 
whom typically have the largest capital invested under hedge funds. Lower income 
groups are not broadly available to invest in hedge funds. Recently year, Rajnish (2011) 
point out that increasing number of institutional investors such as university endowments 
and pension funds have put assets under hedge fund management.  
Recent years sees a trend of increasing asset under management of hedge funds. 
In 1990s, hedge funds had noticeable performance without big amount of asset under 
management. According to the latest Hedge Fund Research data, the whole industry 
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capital of hedge fund in the latest quarter was $2.38 trillion, and has increased 160 
percent in just five years.  
During the financial crisis, the hedge fund industry recorded the lowest return in 
the year 2008, with the AUM declined severely simultaneously. The unprecedented and 
serious destress of financial crisis contributed to the lowest return in 2008 and the overall 
returns rebounded after the financial crisis. While the rate of return increase post financial 
crisis is not parallel with the growth rate of industry capital, the hedge fund industry 
return shows the declining trend. Thus there is a necessity to check the validity of the 
William Fung and David A. Hsieh’s seven-factor model and test if it adapt to the 
circumstance change of hedge funds. 
Hedge fund trading strategy 
At the present time, hedge funds are skilled at utilizing a series of financial 
instruments such as holding the long/short position to make profit by arbitrage and hedge 
away the market risk. Hedge funds apply dynamic investment strategies which seek 
distinctive investment opportunities in the market and then dynamically trade their 
investment portfolios with the effort to track high and absolute returns.  
Different hedge fund employ various trading strategies, and there existed more 
than 30 different investment strategies. According to the Hedge Fund Research, Inc., 
there are four main classifications of hedge fund strategies: “1. Event-Driven strategies: 
typically based on corporate restructuring or acquisition that creates profit opportunities 
for long and short positions in commend equity, or debt of a specific corporation. 2. 
Relative Value: involve buying a security and selling short a related security with the 
goal of profiting when a perceived pricing discrepancy between the two is resolved. 3. 
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Macro strategies: based on global economic trends and events and may involve long or 
short positions in equities, fixed income, currencies, or commodities. 4. Equity hedge 
fund strategies: seek to profit from long or short positions in publicly traded equities and 
derivatives with equities as their underlying assets.” The classification and inclusions of 
these hedge fund strategies are described below. 
Event Driven mainly includes: “1. Credit Arbitrage Strategies employ an 
investment process designed to isolate attractive opportunities in corporate fixed income 
securities; 2. Distressed Restructuring Strategies which employ an investment process 
focused on corporate fixed income instruments, primarily on corporate credit instruments 
of companies trading at significant discounts to their value at issuance or obliged (par 
value) at maturity as a result of either formal bankruptcy proceeding or financial market 
perception of near term proceedings. 3. Merger Arbitrage strategies which employ an 
investment process primarily focused on opportunities in equity and equity related 
instruments of companies which are currently engaged in a corporate transaction. ”Equity 
Hedge: Equity Hedge strategies maintain positions both long and short in primarily 
equity and equity derivative securities. 1. Equity Market Neutral strategies employ 
sophisticated quantitative techniques of analysing price data to ascertain information 
about future price movement and relationships between securities, select securities for 
purchase and sale. 2. Fundamental Value strategies which employ investment processes 
designed to identify attractive opportunities in securities of companies which trade a 
valuation metrics by which the manager determines them to be inexpensive and 
undervalued when compared with relevant benchmarks. 3. Fundamental Growth 
strategies employ analytical techniques in which the investment thesis is predicated on 
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assessment of the valuation characteristics on the underlying companies which are 
expected to have prospects for earnings growth and capital appreciation exceeding those 
of the broader equity market. 4. Short-Biased strategies employ analytical techniques in 
which the investment thesis is predicated on assessment of the valuation characteristics 
on the underlying companies with the goal of identifying overvalued companies. 5. 
Multi-Strategy: Investment Managers maintain positions both long and short in primarily 
equity and equity derivative securities.” 
Macro: “1. Active Trading strategies utilize active trading methods, typically with 
high frequency position turnover or leverage; these may employ components of both 
Discretionary and Systematic Macro strategies.” 2. Trading strategies related to 
Commodity: Commodity – Agriculture, Commodity – Energy and Commodity – Multi. 
3.  
Relative Value: “1. Fixed Income - Asset Backed includes strategies in which the 
investment thesis is predicated on realization of a spread between related instruments in 
which one or multiple components of the spread is a fixed income instrument backed 
physical collateral or other financial obligations (loans, credit cards) other than those of a 
specific corporation. 2. Fixed Income - Convertible Arbitrage includes strategies in which 
the investment thesis is predicated on realization of a spread between related instruments 
in which one or multiple components of the spread is a convertible fixed income 
instrument. Volatility strategies trade volatility as an asset class, employing arbitrage, 
directional, market neutral or a mix of types of strategies, and include exposures which 
can be long, short, neutral or variable to the direction of implied volatility, and can 
include both listed and unlisted instruments." 
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Risk and Return Characteristic 
It has been proven that hedge fund can obtained better than the traditional global 
equities in the downside markets and lagged the returns of the traditional equities in the 
upside markets. Among different time periods, different hedge fund strategies have the 
best performance. Because of the great amount of strategies utilized, hedge fund can run 
into problems with its performance due to over diversification with other alternative 
investment asset classes.  Less than perfect correlation with global equity returns could 
offer some diversification benefits. However, during financial crisis the correlation tend 
to increase.   
William Fung and David A. Hsieh (2007) had done research to see the risk in 
hedge fund strategies and they have obtained evidence from long/short equity hedge 
funds. They concluded that “There is no evidence of a negative effect of fund size on 
managers' ability to deliver alpha. In addition, non-factor related returns, or alpha, are 
positively correlated to market activity and negatively correlated to aggregate short 
interest. In contrast, equity mutual funds and long-bias equity hedge funds have no 
significant, persistent, non-factor related return. Expressed differently, L/S equity hedge 
funds, as the name suggests, do benefit from shorting. Besides differences in risk taking 
behaviour, this is a key feature distinguishing L/S funds from long-bias funds.” 
In this paper, we have examined the influences of non-standard assets classes by 
cumulative return of the funds with exposure to alternative investment with the 
cumulative return of the funds without exposure. The returns examined include types of 
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return: absolute cumulative return stated in monthly term and risk adjusted return which 
is the monthly return adjusted for the monthly volatility.  Every single fund’s return are 
calculated and then sorted into high to low order. The returns are further divided into 5 
quantiles and then split into 2 groups: one for hedge funds without investment to non-
traditional asset classes and one with. Lastly, we studies the percentage composition of 
each of groups (relative to the group’s own total number of funds) to the theoretical 20% 
composition. The process is repeated for three time periods that included pre-financial 
crisis era, during financial crisis era and post financial crisis era. The comparison result 
are presented in the Appendix of this paper. As we can see funds that invests in non-
traditional asset classes only performed over and above the funds that did not have 
exposure during the financial crisis periods both in the absolute return and risk adjusted 
return basis.  The fact that alternative investments, as demonstrated in Appendix, does not 
help funds with them to generate better risk adjusted return compare to the funds that 
does not venture into the non-traditional investment world is an interesting phenomenon. 
In this paper, we will use the seven-factor model by Fund and Heish (2004) to examine 
the alpha between funds with exposure to non-standard asset classes and funds without 
exposure and see how well the two groups of hedge funds did in terms of alphas. 
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Data  
We obtain hedge fund data from Lipper TASS, a widely used database for the 
academic and empirical studies of hedge fund. The Lipper TASS provides the monthly 
returns of individual hedge funds as well as the net assets under management reported in 
US dollars. The hedge funds in the TASSS database can be divided into eleven categories 
according to their investment strategies which included Dedicated Short Bias, Equity 
Market Neutral, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Convertible Arbitrage, Multi-Strategy 
Long/Short Equity Hedge, Equity Market Neutral, Managed Futures, Event Driven, 
Global Macro, Emerging Markets, and Funds of Hedge Funds. Also the individual hedge 
fund could be classified based on their exposure of asset classes. There are three major 
Non-standard asset classes the funds involved with: Commodities, Currencies, and 
Properties. And each major Non-standard asset class covers several sub asset classes. The 
category of Commodities includes sub classes of Agriculturals, BaseMetals, Commodity, 
Energy, ExchangeTraded, Forwards, Futures, Indices, Metals, Options, OTC, Physical, 
PreciousMetals and Softs. Currencies category is constituted of Currency, 
ExchangeTraded, Forwards, Futures, HedgingOnly, Options, OTC, Spot and Swaps. The 
category of Properties includes OtherAssets and Property. In our analysis, we combine 
some non-standard sub asset class into 1 overall sub asset class as there is overlapping 
quality existed.  
William Fung and David A. Hsieh (2004) used an equally weighted average 
return of all hedge funds in the TASS database (TASSAVG) to represent overall hedge 
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fund returns. They constructed the equal weighted index of TASSAVG from all the live 
funds from TASS database. Generally there are three different ways to construct 
investable index (equally weighted, price weighted, or value weighted).  
For this article, we will follow Fung and Hsieh (2004)’s strategy to construct our 
three equal weighted index of TASS. The first is TASSAVG (noNS+NS) index, an 
equally weighted average return of all individual hedge funds in the TASS database and 
covers all funds that have exposure with non-standard assets and funds without non-
standard assets exposure. Another is the TASSAVG_noNS index, a constructed equal 
weighted hedge fund index which have no weight in non-standard assets. Last the 
TASSAVG_NS index is the equal weighted fund index that have exposure with non-
standard assets. 
Since we will utilize the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model to do the 
analysis of the hedge fund returns, the accuracy of the seven factor data is extremely 
significant for our regression. We have found the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor 
model data from the database below: The data for S&P500 index, Russell 2000 indexes, 
Wilshire Small Cap 1750 index and Wilshire Large Cap 750 index are accessible through 
‘ThomsonOne.com Investment Banking’ database.  The bond data for the 10 year U.S. 
treasury yield and Moody's Baa yield can be found on the official U.S. Federal Reserve 
website. The trend following straddle portfolio return data are updated and archived 
online at the ‘David A. Hsieh's Data Library’. We also find the data of HFRFOF index 
from the Wharton Hedge Fund Research Database.  
 
15 
 
Methodology and Results Analysis 
Seven-Factor Model 
In this paper, we used the seven-factor model by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to 
analyse the performance of hedge funds. The original seven factors in the model include 
two equity-oriented risk factors, two bond-oriented risk factors and three trend-following 
risk factors.  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽𝑖2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 
                + 𝛽𝑖310𝑌𝑟𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
                +𝛽𝑖5𝑡𝑓𝐵𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖6𝑡𝑓𝐹𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖7𝑡𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
We kept the factors same as per Fund and Heish’s model. The equity-oriented 
factors account for the market effect (MKT) and size effect (SMB) of the U.S. equity 
market. The MKT factor is the monthly return on the S&P 500 index. The SMB factor is 
monthly change of Wilshire Small Cap 1750 index return less Wilshire Large Cap 750 
index return. However, due to the fact that both of the Wilshire indexes ceased to exist as 
of August of 2006, we have opted to use it as the SMB factor only for the purpose of 
replicating the original results. We will use the monthly difference between Russell2000 
index return and S&P 500 index return as the SMB factor for our own analysis. The bond-
oriented factors capture the bond effect (10YrY) and credit spread effect (CredSpr) on the 
U.S. bond market.  The 10YrY factor is the monthly change, at month end, of the 10-year 
U.S. treasury yield while the CredSpr factor is the monthly difference between the 
Moody's Baa yield and the 10-year U.S. treasury yield. The trend following factors 
16 
 
attempts to examine effect of trending dynamic trading strategies. The three factors is for 
bond trend, currency trend and commodity trend. The factors are the monthly return of a 
portfolio of lookback straddles future on their respective underlying asset. Lastly, r 
denotes either the monthly return of the hedge fund index or the monthly return of the 
hedge fund and ε represent the error term of the regression. 
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Model Test on the Seven-Factor Model  
In the first step, model tests on the seven-factor model were conducted. Two sets 
of data were used for the assessment: the HFRI Fund of Funds Composite Index 
(HFRFOF) and the constructed TASSAVG index. The SMB factor used for first set of 
tests in this step will be the base on the Wilshire indexes, and the regression will be 
perform over the same time periods as the original paper’s with the intent to replicate the 
original paper result as closely as possible. A small modification to the SMB factor will 
be introduced later in this step. The regression statistics prior and post modification will 
be compared and analysed. 
Regression with the HFRFOF Index  
Our regression results of HFRFOF index against the seven hedge fund risk factors 
are presented in Table 1. The R2 of our analysis resemble that of the R2 statistics of Fung 
and Hsieh’s:  Fund and Hsieh’s R2 statistics for HFRFOF index are 0.55, 0.69 and 0.80 
respectively for the time period 01/1994 – 12/2002, 01/1994 – 09/1998 and 04/2000 – 
12/2002. The actual result are presented under model A, B and C in Table 1. Although 
the estimated coefficients of the regression differs by 0.001 – 0.05 in our tests, but the 
significance level on the factor coefficients are fairly consistent. The R2 statistics of 
regression measures the “goodness” of the fit and here can be interpreted as the 
percentage of variation of index return explained by the seven risk factors. R2 statistics by 
itself may be a non-reliable measure of the explanatory power for multi-factor regression 
model. This is due to the fact that R2 almost always increases as more independent 
variables are added to the model, even if the new variables is not statistically significant. 
The adjusted R2 statistics adjusts the R2 statistic based on the number of independent 
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variables in the model and is a more reliable measure of fit. We can spot that the adjusted 
R2 of our results are very strong and close the R2, which suggest that the Seven-Factor 
model can describe a substantial part of the systematic risk of typical hedge fund 
portfolios in those periods. 
SMB factor Substitution 
One thing we observed in the study is that, the two Wilshire indexes used in 
original SMB factor (SMB original) are dead indexes; the data available on those 
particular indexes ends on August of 2006. Consider our paper’s investigation time frame 
is up until January 2015, it is essential find a suitable substitute for the SMB factor with 
obtainable data all the way to 2015. We have chosen to use the monthly return difference 
between Russell 2000 index and S&P 500 index as the new SMF factor (SMB new). 
Since the Russell 2000 index measures the performance of small-cap segment of the U.S. 
equity universe and S&P 500 index is an U.S. stock market index based on the market 
capitalization of 500 large companies listed on NYSE or NASDAQ, it looks like a good 
representation of the size effect in the U.S. equity market. The results from regression (1) 
– (3) in Table 1 are generated with the original SMB factor while the results from 
regression (4) – (6) are regressed with the new SMB factor. As we can see, the R2 and 
adjusted R2 statistics for the regression with the new SMB factor are analogous to the 
statistics from the regression with the original SMB factor. Combine with that fact that 
the significance level of the factor coefficients from the new SMB factor are very similar 
to that of the original factor regression, it can be concluded the new SMB is a decent 
substitute of the original factor and will not undercut the integrity of the Seven-Factor 
model. 
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Table 1. Regression of HFRFOF index on Seven Hedge Fund Risk Factors  
 Fung & Hsieh’s original result Replicate HFRFOF result HFRFOF result with the new SMB factor 
 (A) (B) (C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 
MKT 0.2153 0.3242 0.1730 0.2142*** 0.3178*** 0.1696*** 0.2169*** 0.3228*** 0.1702*** 
 (0.0287)** (0.0453)** (0.0293)** (0.0285) (0.0453) (0.0298) (0.0289) (0.0453) (0.0285) 
          
SMB (original) 0.2256 0.1779 0.1497 0.2269*** 0.1773** 0.1632***    
 (0.0362)** (0.0662)** (0.0363)** (0.0359) (0.0655) (0.0372)    
          
SMB (new)       0.1906*** 0.1464* 0.1449*** 
       (0.0312) (0.0570) (0.0300) 
          
10YrY –1.5644 –1.1171 –2.7080 -1.4972* -1.0040 -2.6360*** -1.5743* -0.9994 -2.7021*** 
 (0.6540)** -0.9495 (0.6326)** (0.6437) (0.9468) (0.6176) (0.6490) (0.9569) (0.5850) 
          
CredSpr –2.9639 –6.6649 –2.1305 -2.9515* -6.1545** -2.2141* -3.2466** -6.3910** -2.3386* 
 (1.1919)** (2.2477)** (0.9816)* (1.1834) (2.2780) (1.0075) (1.1856) (2.2995) (0.9469) 
          
tfBd –0.0152 –0.0105 –0.0068 -0.0194* -0.0151 -0.0082 -0.0181* -0.0148 -0.0061 
 (0.0073)* -0.01064 -0.0060 (0.0077) (0.0110) (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0110) (0.0069) 
          
tfFX 0.0070 0.0065 0.0031 0.0080 0.0076 0.0047 0.0073 0.0073 0.0027 
 -0.0067 -0.0074 -0.0069 (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0067) 
          
tfComm 0.0190 0.0271 0.0356 0.0204* 0.0285* 0.0305* 0.0200 0.0290* 0.0281* 
 (0.0104)* (0.0138)* (0.0128)** (0.0100) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.0109) 
          
Constant 0.0047 0.0019 0.0021 0.0049*** 0.0021 0.0018 0.0051*** 0.0020 0.0019 
 (0.0012)** -0.0017 -0.0013 (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0012) 
Observations    108 57 33 108 57 33 
R2 0.55 0.69 0.8 0.563 0.695 0.795 0.555 0.691 0.813 
Adjusted R2    0.532 0.652 0.738 0.523 0.647 0.760 
Standard errors in parentheses for model 1-6 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Regression with the TASSAVG index 
The constructed TASSAVG index is fabricated from equally weighting the 
average return of all hedge funds in the Lipper TASS Academic Hedge Fund Database. 
We have use the ‘live research file for March 2015 Revised’ dataset. It contains 
individual hedge fund data up to January of 2015, thus allowing us to back test the 
TASSAVG index for all three of the test periods. Evidently, result of the TASSAVG 
index against the seven hedge fund risk factors in Table 2 differs from Fung and Hsieh’s 
result in their 2004 paper. Fund and Hsieh’s R2 statistics for TASSAVG index are 0.73, 
0.46 and 0.71 respectively for the time period 01/1994 – 12/2002, 02/1995 – 09/1998 and 
04/2000 – 12/2002, which are found in Table 2 and 4 of their paper. In particular the R2 
statistics and adjusted R2 statistics for time period 1994 to 2002 in our study is only 0.46 
and 0.43 respectively. The two equity market factors’ coefficient remain at the same 
significance while the bond factors dwindled in their power of significance. The trend 
following factors significance varies time period to time period compare to the original 
output.  The analysis yield closer estimation in the two sub-period compare to the overall 
time period. The deviation of outcomes is most likely owing to the difference in 
composition of index since Fund and Hsieh created their version of the TASSAVG index 
using the TASS database ending March 2003.  
A number of hedge funds have been added and few have dropped out of the 2015 
version of the TASS database. Out of the total of 5612 funds, 2841 new hedge funds have 
been newly introduced to the database since 2003. 455 of the 2841 funds have been 
removed by 2015, leaving 2386 new funds in the TASS database. In addition, 279 funds 
that existed prior to 2003 have purged from the database by 2015. Considering the 
TASSAVG index excludes fund of funds, 1896 funds must be excluded as they have 
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exposure in other funds. Furthermore, 1623 out of the remaining useable 3716 funds has 
incomplete data regarding either performance detail or asset details; this cuts the number 
of fund available for examination down to 2093.The data has survivorship bias, which 
explains why 1623 funds out of the 3716 non-fund-of-fund funds have incomplete data. 
Moreover, when the 2417 new funds enter the database, their past performance history is 
also added, which creates instant-history bias. A typically fund that joins the database 
would have a successful record in its incubation period since funds with relatively poor 
performance would cease to operate. Therefore, when a data vendor backfills the fund’s 
performance, there is an upward bias in its return. Consequently, because of the 
composition difference and the biases associated with data and composition, the model 
produced less explanatory power with our TASSAVG data compare to the original result. 
Similar to the tests on HFRFOF index, we have perform the tests with the new 
SMB factor on the TASSAVG index. In Table 2, (1) – (3) are result completed with the 
original SMB factor and (4) – (6) are result done with the new SMB factor. As we can see, 
the R2 and adjusted R2 statistics for the regression with the new SMB factor are analogous 
to the statistics from the regression with the original SMB factor. For the TASSAVG, we 
can draw the conclusion that substituting the new SMB will not distort the effectiveness 
of model on the TASSAVG. However, we have to keep in mind that, while the Seven-
Factor model does explain close to half of the systematic risk, it did not perform as well it 
was intended for the TASSAVG index in all tested time period. 
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Table 2. Regression of TASSAVG index on Seven Hedge Fund Risk Factors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 
MKT 0.2262*** 0.2607*** 0.1993*** 0.2282*** 0.2663*** 0.1997*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0681) (0.0321) (0.0330) (0.0682) (0.0320) 
       
SMB (original) 0.1931*** 0.1664 0.1861***    
 (0.0412) (0.0986) (0.0401)    
       
SMB (new)    0.1608*** 0.1291 0.1574*** 
    (0.0357) (0.0858) (0.0337) 
       
10YrY -1.7086* -2.0694 -1.8088* -1.7751* -2.0200 -1.9209** 
 (0.7381) (1.4255) (0.6657) (0.7426) (1.4395) (0.6572) 
       
CredSpr -2.7818* -5.9132 -0.9888 -3.0431* -6.1057 -1.2177 
 (1.3570) (3.4298) (1.0861) (1.3565) (3.4589) (1.0638) 
       
tfBd 0.0004 0.0062 -0.0013 0.0015 0.0066 0.0013 
 (0.0089) (0.0165) (0.0078) (0.0089) (0.0166) (0.0077) 
       
tfFX 0.0097 0.0011 0.0164* 0.0092 0.0010 0.0144 
 (0.0076) (0.0112) (0.0075) (0.0077) (0.0112) (0.0075) 
       
tfComm 0.0247* 0.0458* 0.0144 0.0243* 0.0459* 0.0119 
 (0.0115) (0.0206) (0.0122) (0.0116) (0.0209) (0.0122) 
       
Constant 0.0125*** 0.0110*** 0.0087*** 0.0126*** 0.0109*** 0.0089*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0014) 
Observations 108 57 33 108 57 33 
R2 0.464 0.412 0.791 0.456 0.405 0.792 
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.327 0.732 0.418 0.320 0.734 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Testing Non-standard Asset Classes Influence with Hedge Fund Returns 
Splitting TASSAVG into 2 more index for 1994 to 2002 
In order to examine the effect of alternative investment on hedge fund, the hedge 
funds are further split into 2 categories: ones with exposure only to the traditional asset 
classes like equity and fixed income and ones with exposure to the non-standard asset 
classes. Out of the useable 2093 funds, 1089 (or 52%) funds lack non-standard asset 
exposure and will be grouped under into the TASSAVG_noNS index and the other l004 
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(or 48%) will be group under the TASSAVG_NS index. The regression is ran with the 
new SMB factor as it has been established previously that the new SMB factor is 
essentially just as good as the original SMB factor. For the full test period of 1994 to 
2002, it seem to have similar explanatory power for the TASSAVG_NS and TASSAVG 
index. However, we can observe that the seven-factor model is mixed in its explanatory 
power when we split the full period into two sub periods. For the TASSAVG_noNS, a 
trimmed down version of the seven-factor model is used. Considering the 
TASSAVG_noNS index has no exposure to alternative investment, we can safely to 
remove the commodity trend following factor, tfComm and the currency trend following 
factor, tfFX. The modified models explanatory power for the TASSAVG_noNS index is 
very high for the 2000-2002 period but is questionable in the 1994-1998 period. For the 
overall full period, the explanatory power is similar to that of the TASSAVG and 
TASSAVG_NS index.
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Table 3. Regression of the three TASSAVG index on Seven Hedge Fund Risk Factors 
 TASSAVG TASSAVG_noNS TASSAVG_NS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 1994~2002 1994~1998 2000~2002 
MKT 0.2282*** 0.2663*** 0.1997*** 0.3374*** 0.3229* 0.2962*** 0.1392*** 0.2329*** 0.1062* 
 (0.0330) (0.0682) (0.0320) (0.0516) (0.1219) (0.0320) (0.0342) (0.0562) (0.0436) 
          
SMB (new) 0.1608*** 0.1291 0.1574*** 0.2019*** 0.1565 0.2184*** 0.1318*** 0.1384 0.1009* 
 (0.0357) (0.0858) (0.0337) (0.0561) (0.1492) (0.0335) (0.0369) (0.0707) (0.0459) 
          
10YrY -1.7751* -2.0200 -1.9209** -1.0870 -1.6399 -1.3929* -2.2935** -1.9191 -2.4128* 
 (0.7426) (1.4395) (0.6572) (1.1663) (2.5204) (0.6572) (0.7683) (1.1858) (0.8951) 
          
CredSpr -3.0431* -6.1057 -1.2177 -3.1441 -6.1061 -2.4013* -2.7462 -5.1875 0.1619 
 (1.3565) (3.4589) (1.0638) (2.1258) (6.0345) (0.9720) (1.4035) (2.8493) (1.4489) 
          
tfBd 0.0015 0.0066 0.0013 -0.0160 -0.0189 -0.0122 0.0135 0.0197 0.0154 
 (0.0089) (0.0166) (0.0077) (0.0139) (0.0279) (0.0077) (0.0092) (0.0137) (0.0105) 
          
tfFX 0.0092 0.0010 0.0144    0.0183* 0.0064 0.0266* 
 (0.0077) (0.0112) (0.0075)    (0.0079) (0.0093) (0.0102) 
          
tfComm 0.0243* 0.0459* 0.0119    0.0497*** 0.1031*** 0.0153 
 (0.0116) (0.0209) (0.0122)    (0.0120) (0.0172) (0.0166) 
          
Constant 0.0126*** 0.0109*** 0.0089*** 0.0124*** 0.0111* 0.0081*** 0.0128*** 0.0107*** 0.0092*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0047) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0019) 
Observations 
 
108 57 33 108 57 33 108 57 33 
R2 0.456 0.405 0.792 0.411 0.242 0.907 0.403 0.622 0.594 
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.320 0.734 0.382 0.168 0.890 0.362 0.567 0.480 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Extension of the Seven-factor model to the period of 2000 to 2015 
We further test the William Fung and David A. Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model 
using the data from the Lipper TASS database for the period of 2000 to 2015. By making 
Regression of TASSAVG index on seven Hedge Fund risk factors, we could get the 
result of whether the model still valid during this period. Due to the financial crisis 
influence with the market, we have splitted our regression with three period: Pre-crisis 
period, During-crisis period and Post-crisis period. We categorized the period of Pre-
crisis from the year March 2000 to December 2006, the period of During-crisis from 
January 2007 to December 2010, and Post-crisis from January 2011 to January 2015. 
Considering the influence of both Global Financial Crisis (begin from 2007) and 
European sovereign debt crisis (2010), we divide during-crisis period from 2007 to 2010. 
The regression would show the level of validation of the seven-factor model among 
different time period. Below is the result analysis. 
Pre-Crisis period Analysis   
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of our pre-crisis period regressions of the 
three equal weighted TASS index using the William Fung and David A. Hsieh (2004) 
seven-factor model. TASSAVG (noNS+NS) is an equally weighted average return of all 
individual hedge funds in the TASS database (TASSAVG) and covers all funds that have 
exposure with non-standard assets and funds without non-standard assets exposure. 
TASSAVG_noNS is the constructed equal weighted hedge fund index which have no 
weight in non-standard assets. TASSAVG_NS is the equal weighted fund index that have 
exposure with non-standard assets. 
The statistics clearly shows that from April 2000 to December 2006, the William 
Fung and David A. Hsieh’s seven-factor model gives good explanation for the returns of 
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the TASSAVG (nNS+NS) index as its adjusted R2 is 0.589. The trimmed down factor 
model also offers good explanations for TASSAVG_noNS index as the adjusted R2 is 
0.804. The seven-factor model is extremely valid for the index without non-standard 
assets exposure. However, the seven-factor model could not give very strong explanation 
for the TASSAVG_NS index, with only a R2 of 0.332 and an adjusted R2 of 0.278. 
The first column of Table 4 shows the regression of the TASSAVG (noNS+NS), 
index with both non-standard and traditional asset classes. The two equity ABS factors 
(MKT and SMB) are very significant for the pre-crisis period. While exposure to Bond-
oriented factors of 10YrY and CredSpr are insignificant during this period. It is observed 
that TASSAVG exposure to all the tree trend-following factors of FX, Bond and 
Commodity are statistically significant. These observations confirms William Fung and 
David A. Hsieh’s observation that, “on average, hedge fund portfolios have systematic 
exposures to directional equity as well as systematic exposures to long–short equity”. 
However, interest rate bets and credit spread bets are not as statistically significant as 
previously. It seems an investor can achieve an overall alpha of over 97 bps every month. 
The average monthly alpha improved from 78 bps (alpha from William Fung and David 
A. Hsieh’s finding from 1994 to 2002) to 97 bps 
Table 4. Regression of the three TASSAVG index (March 2000 - December 2006) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TASSAVG TASSAVG_noNS TASSAVG_NS 
MKT 0.2098*** 0.3123*** 0.1107* 
 (0.0344) (0.0280) (0.0485) 
    
SMB (new) 0.1987*** 0.2478*** 0.1616** 
 (0.0379) (0.0303) (0.0534) 
    
10YrY -1.3011* -0.8560 -1.7002* 
 (0.5420) (0.4394) (0.7643) 
    
CredSpr -1.4531 -1.7356* -0.8621 
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 (1.0773) (0.8510) (1.5190) 
    
tfBd -0.0005 -0.0036 0.0043 
 (0.0085) (0.0069) (0.0120) 
    
tfFX 0.0173*  0.0269** 
 (0.0068)  (0.0095) 
    
tfComm 0.0197*  0.0299* 
 (0.0089)  (0.0126) 
    
Constant 0.0097*** 0.0085*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0017) 
Observations 
R2 
81 
0.625 
81 
0.816 
81 
0.380 
Adjusted R2 0.589 0.804 0.321 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
During-Crisis period Analysis 
Table 5 provide the regression results of the TASSAVG (noNS+NS), the 
TASSAVG_noNS, and the TASSAVG_NS on the seven hedge fund risk factors for the 
period of financial crisis from January 2007 to December 2009. It shows that ABS factor 
model regressions remain valid for the TASSAVG (noNS+NS) and TASSAVG_noNS, as 
their adjusted R2 (0.755 and 0.867) improves when comparing with the Pre-crisis period. 
ABS seven-factor model also works better for the TASSAVG_NS index, with its R2 
statistic (0.560) over the 0.50 mark and enhanced adjusted R2 (0.483). The ABS factor 
model gives better explanation of the returns of hedge funds within non-standard assets 
exposure during crisis period than the previous period. The overall improvement of the 
three indexes’ adjusted R2 illustrates that the ABS factor model is more valid in the crisis 
period. An investor following this model during crisis could get more accurate insights of 
hedge fund returns. The three indexes show very similar ABS factor exposure. It is 
noticeable that for the crisis period, MKT factor remained highly significant for the three 
indexes’ returns. Exposure to Bond-oriented factors of 10YrY and CredSpr are still not 
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significant during financial crisis period and SMB factor’s level of significant drops 
surprisingly compared with the prior period. While the other three ABS factors are 
significant during this period as illustrated in Table 5. This could be explained by the 
view that financial crisis simultaneously influence different markets, resulting in 
increased correlations between different asset classes and tightening interactions between 
different ABS factors. Looking through the alpha of the TASSAVG index, it drops from 
97 bps of prior period from to 87 bps, which is consistent with the history record of 
decreasing hedge fund return during financial crisis. 
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Table 5. Regression of the three TASSAVG index (January 2007 - December 2010) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TASSAVG TASSAVG_noNS TASSAVG_NS 
MKT 0.2809*** 0.3395*** 0.2127*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0386) (0.0515) 
    
SMB (new) -0.1697* -0.1472* -0.1884 
 (0.0780) (0.0702) (0.0939) 
    
10YrY -0.0180 -0.4523 0.3857 
 (0.7634) (0.6719) (0.9183) 
    
CredSpr -2.6972*** -3.7313*** -1.6825 
 (0.7146) (0.5760) (0.8596) 
    
tfBd 0.0014 -0.0134 0.0150 
 (0.0159) (0.0133) (0.0191) 
    
tfFX -0.0075  -0.0143 
 (0.0124)  (0.0150) 
    
tfComm 0.0118  0.0313 
 (0.0162)  (0.0195) 
    
Constant 0.0087*** 0.0077*** 0.0098*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0023) 
Observations 48 48 48 
R2 0.791 0.881 0.560 
Adjusted R2 0.755 0.867 0.483 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Post-crisis Analysis 
Table 6 contains our regression results of the Post-crisis period for the TASSAVG 
(noNS+NS), the TASSAVG_noNS, and the TASSAVG_NS index. We surprisingly 
observed that for the most recent years, the validity of William Fung and David A. 
Hsieh’s seven-factor model dramatically decrease. This circumstances showed directly 
from the column three of Table 6, the result of TASSAVG_NS index that equally 
weighted constructed of the individual funds that have weight in the non-standard asset 
classes. The adjusted R2 drops intensively from 0.483 of crisis period to almost non-
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existent during post-crisis period. Thus the ABS factor model could not be a good 
reference to understand and analyse the returns of the TASSAVG_NS index. While 
adjusted R2 level of TASSAVG (noNS+NS) and the TASSAVG_noNS index result are 
still acceptable for us to analyse hedge funds exposure to various ABS factors.  
According to the Table 6, the TASSAVG (noNS+NS) and the TASSAVG_noNS 
indexes have statistically insignificant betas for the equity ABS factor of MKT and SMB. 
And their exposure to the fixed income ABS factor of 10YrY is also still insignificant. 
While their exposure to the trend-following factors of FX, Bond and Commodity are 
significant after financial crisis. When comparing the alphas of the two indexes, the value 
of the intercept terms are quite small when compared with both the pre-crisis period and 
during-crisis period, with only 45 bps for the TASSAVG index and 15 bps for the 
TASSAVG_noNS. This illustrates the further declination of hedge fund returns after 
financial crisis. We consider that the William Fung and David A. Hsieh’s seven-factor 
need some improvements to give better explanation for the return of funds with non-
standard asset classes.   
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Table 6. Regression of the three TASSAVG index (January 2011 - January 2015) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 TASSAVG TASSAVG_noNS TASSAVG_NS 
MKT 0.1863 0.3846*** -0.0090 
 (0.1078) (0.0921) (0.1887) 
    
SMB (new) 0.1485 0.1510 0.1571 
 (0.1293) (0.1132) (0.2263) 
    
10YrY -0.2421 -1.3188 0.9243 
 (1.5435) (1.3656) (2.7011) 
    
CredSpr -4.2495 -3.7491 -4.6350 
 (2.4441) (2.1604) (4.2771) 
    
tfBd -0.0053 -0.0121 0.0095 
 (0.0218) (0.0170) (0.0382) 
    
tfFX -0.0018  -0.0179 
 (0.0163)  (0.0286) 
    
tfComm 0.0146  0.0427 
 (0.0176)  (0.0308) 
    
Constant 0.0045 0.0015 0.0070 
 (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0052) 
Observations 49 49 49 
R2 0.334 0.568 0.114 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.518 0.037 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
After comparing the model validity during the different time period, we 
concluded that it is still available for us to use the seven-factor model to continuously test 
the non-standard influence with the hedge fund returns. 
Testing Non-standard Asset Classes Influence for 2000 to 2015 
We continue to test the non-standard assets’ influence on hedge fund return by 
performing t-test on alphas of the individual funds. In this step, each funds are fitted with 
the modified seven-factor model as funds would have different betas. T-tests were 
performed to verify whether the alpha is statistically between hedge funds with only 
exposure to traditional asset class (group 0) and hedge funds with exposure to both 
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traditional and alternative asset class (group 1).  The null hypothesis for the two sided t-
test tests whether the two alpha are the same. The tests will be conducted over the same 
three time periods mentioned in the extension of seven-factor model: March 2000 to 
December 2006, January 2007 to December 2010 and January 2011 to January 2015.  
The regression equation used is the modified seven-factor model, with tfFX factor and 
tfComm factor removed. The reason for excluding the trend following currency and 
commodity factor is that both currency and commodity is a non-standard asset class, we 
do not want to systematically account for return from them.  
During the first time period of interest (2000-2006), the t-test showed 
inconclusive result. That is, we cannot reject the null hypothesis even at 5% significance 
that the alpha is different in the 2 subset of hedge funds. There is limited benefit in 
diversifying into the non-traditional in the pre-financial crisis period.   
 
Table 7: Two-sample t test with unequal variances from March 2000 – December 2006 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     491    .0095455    .0008257     .018297    .0079231    .0111679 
       1 |     473    .0113551    .0012475    .0271316    .0089038    .0138065 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |     964    .0104334    .0007429    .0230644    .0089756    .0118912 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0018096     .001496               -.0047461    .0011269 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.2096 
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  823.855 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.1134         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2268          Pr(T > t) = 0.8866 
 
As for the financial crisis phase (2007 - 2010), the t-test showed promising 
results. We are able to reject that two-sided test beyond the significance level of 1%; that 
is the alpha between hedge funds with only exposure to the traditional asset class (group 
0) and hedge funds with exposure (group 1) is difference. In fact, according the one sided 
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t-test, it is statistically significant that the alpha of hedge with alternative asset exposure 
(group 1) is better than the funds in group 0. It can be concluded that investing in 
alternative class lessen the blow of the Subprime Mortgage crisis and the European 
Solvent Debt crisis. 
Table 8: Two-sample t test with unequal variances from January 2007 – December 2010 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |     851    .0085542    .0003724    .0108649    .0078232    .0092852 
       1 |     794    .0099729    .0003943    .0111102    .0091989    .0107469 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    1645     .009239    .0002713    .0110035    .0087068    .0097711 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0014187    .0005424               -.0024825   -.0003548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -2.6156 
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  1629.31 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0045         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0090          Pr(T > t) = 0.9955 
 
For the period following the two financial crisis,  diversification effect of the non-
standard asset class is again mixed. The t-test could not reject the hypothesis of that the 
alpha between the two group of hedge fund are same. Although the one-sided t-test with 
alternative hypothesis for higher alpha in group 1, the group with investment in non-
standard asset class, did strength compare to the pre-crisis from 0.1134 (table 7) to 
0.0746(table 9), we still cannot reject the null hypothesis and accept this alternative 
hypothesis of better group 1 alpha in a statically significant way. Keep in mind that this 
can be partially due to the reason that the seven factor model fails to systemically explain 
the return of hedge funds with non-standard asset exposure well, thus the model alpha not 
as reliable. As explained in the model extension step for the post crisis period, the 
adjusted R2 drops to almost non-existent during post-crisis period for funds categorized 
under group 1. 
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Table 9: Two-sample t test with unequal variances from January 2011 – January 2015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       0 |    1089    -.000702    .0007469    .0246477   -.0021675    .0007636 
       1 |    1004    .0314446     .022255    .7051723   -.0122271    .0751164 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
combined |    2093    .0147186    .0106857    .4888628   -.0062371    .0356743 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    diff |           -.0321466    .0222676               -.0758429    .0115496 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.4437 
Ho: diff = 0                     Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =  1005.26 
 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0746         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1491          Pr(T > t) = 0.9254 
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Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used the seven-factor model by Fung and Hsieh (2004) to 
examine the alpha of hedge funds. The hedge funds tested omitted fund of funds as Fung 
and Heish’s model excludes them. Base on the data of non-fund-of-fund hedge funds, the 
analysis demonstrated that while there are significant number of hedge funds that 
invested in alternative investment (1004 out of 2093 funds or 48%), the investment 
benefit of alternative asset class such as commodity, FX and real-estate is almost non-
existential during normal economic condition. Funds that invest in non-standard asset 
classes did benefit from holding them during the financial crisis. We observe that the 
funds which invested in non-standard assets earned a statistically significant excess alpha 
over the funds that did not have exposure during the 2007 to 2010 period. Furthermore, 
according to the empirical test, funds without exposure to non-standard asset classes did 
exhibited higher tendency to underperform in ordinal ranking of fund performance 
relative to the whole TASS hedge fund universe. Thus, it is possible that funds with 
investment in the non-standard assets could outperform those without exposure in future 
financial crisis. 
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Appendix 
Empirical test of hedge fund performance 
Methodology 
In the empirical testing step, the emphasis is on the returns. Cumulative return 
from hedge funds that has no non-standard asset exposure (group 0) and hedge funds that 
has exposure to non-standard asset (group 1) are compared. The cumulative return are 
obtained via geometric method to take account the compounding effect of returns. Two 
type of return are compared here: absolute return and risk adjusted return. For the 
absolute return, it is simply the cumulative return of the period; it is converted into a 
monthly return for ease of comparison as not every single fund exists for the full duration 
of the testing periods. For the risk adjusted return, it is the absolute return divided by the 
monthly standard deviation of the return.  
We order all the hedge fund returns into ascending order and divided them into 
the 5 equal quantiles. Then, funds are split into two groups. The percentage of number of 
fund in each group relative to the total number of fund in that particular group is 
produced. Theoretically, each quantile should have a percentage of 20%. We will 
compare the percentages to see which group of hedges fund has higher portion in the best 
and worst performing quantiles. A lower quantile correspond to lower return and a higher 
quantile correspond to higher return. The empirical test will be conducted over the period 
of March 2000 to December 2006, January 2007 to December 2010 and January 2011 to 
January 2015, same as per the pervious step’s tests.  
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This step excluded 15 funds as there are missing monthly return data during their 
reporting periods. Those fund are removed to as gap in return can cause biased in the 
final cumulative return and the standard deviation. 10 of the funds removed are hedge 
fund without exposure to non-standard asset class and the remaining 5 are funds with 
exposure. 
Empirical Test Results 
We can observe from figure 1 that during that 2000 to 2006 period, group 0 
(funds with no exposure to non-standard asset class) has more percentage of the fund in 
the higher quantile relative to the lower quantile than the group 1 (fund with exposure to 
non-standard asset class), especially in a risk adjusted basis. The percentage composite 
for group 0 in quantile 3 4 5 are all above the theoretical 20% mark. This suggest that 
historically speaking, the in terms of returns, group 0 funds are more likely to place in the 
better return quantile than those from group 1. 
In figure 2, the situation improves for group 1 funds. There are less percentage of 
the funds in the lower quantile (quantile 1 and 2). Group 0 funds on the other hand, had 
its percentage above 20% in the quantile 1 and 2, therefore making it more likely to 
underperform compare to the funds categorized under group 1.  This illustrates that 
during the financial crisis period, hedge fund that has alternative investment benefited 
from the diversification of the non-traditional investment and thus are less probable to be 
placed in the lower quantile.  
After the financial crisis period, the benefit of alternative investment seem to 
disappear again, in fact invest in alternative seem to seem to be dragging the hedge fund 
performance. Group 0 funds as a whopping 24% composition in the fifth quantile, well 
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above the theoretical 20% mark while group 1 funds has higher weights in the lower 
performance quantile. Thus, hedge funds with alternative investment exposure seem to 
have higher likelihood have lower ordinal ranking in terms of fund returns compared the 
funds that do not the exposure.  
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Figure 1: Performance of Hedge funds (2000-2006) 
Figure 2: Performance of Hedge funds (2007-2010) 
Figure 3: Performance of Hedge funds (2007-201
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